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Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.: Re-Assessing
Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures Evidence
in a Products Liability Suit
The Toups family maintained a small shed behind their home to
store their lawn mower, a gas can, and the tricycle of their three year
old son, Shawn. The shed also contained the family's gas hot water
heater. The heater had been properly installed. Its air intake system was
two inches above the ground as designed. It bore no warning to caution
consumers of the danger of storing flammable liquids nearby.
On the day the accident occurred, Richard, the family's twelve year
old son, had cut the lawn and returned the lawn mower and gas can
to the shed. Later, Shawn went to the shed to get his tricycle. Flammable
gasoline vapors, emanating from both the lawn mower and gas can,
entered the ground level air intake system. The heater's pilot light ignited
these vapors, causing a flash fire which severely burnt Shawn. In response
to this and many similar accidents nationwide, Sears added warnings to
the heater and the operator's manual to caution consumers as to the
danger of storing flammable liquids nearby.
Subsequently, Shawn's parents brought a strict products liability suit
against the manufacturer.' On alternative grounds, they contended either
that Sears failed to warn of the danger of storing flammable liquids
near the water heater or that Sears failed to adopt a safer, alternative
design which would have raised the air intake system above the height
where flammable vapors might exist. Sears countered that the water
heater was not defective because it had been built according to the
industry's minimum standards of the time. Additionally, using the de-
fense of scientific unknowability, Sears argued that it could not have
known of this risk with the technology existing at the time it manu-
factured the water heater. Finally, Sears argued that the mother or one
of the children was contributorily negligent in handling the gasoline and
that the mother was contributorily negligent in her supervision of the
children.
Copyright 1988, by LoUIssAlA LAW REViEW.
1. Sears was the vendor of both the lawn mower and the water heater. State
Industries, the manufacturer of the water heater, was also a defendant, but the manu-
facturer of the lawn mower was not joined. Upon appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
the claim based upon the lawn mower was dropped. While both defendants remained,
the court referred only to Sears to avoid confusion.
For questions involving vendor liability, see the court's discussion in Toups v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 507 So. 2d 809, 819 n.27 (La. 1987).
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A jury found that neither the lawn mower nor the water heater was
defective and that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent in their
handling of the gasoline. The jury, however, was not allowed to hear
evidence of the subsequently added warnings in the operator's manual
and on the heater. This evidence arguably would have proved either the
knowledge necessary to create a duty to warn or the feasibility of the
alternative design alleged as possible by the plaintiffs. The Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed both the evidentiary exclusion and the jury
verdict.' In a plurality opinion,3 the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the evidence was improperly excluded from the jury and that
Sears breached its duty to warn of the known danger of storing flammable
liquids near the heater. Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 507 So. 2d 809 (La.
1987).
The Toups opinion raises more than the question of whether a
product was unreasonably dangerous because a manufacturer breached
his duty to warn of a foreseeable risk. More importantly, it addresses
the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a prod-
ucts liability case. This note will analyze the Toups rationale for ad-
missibility and the implications of that rationale. This note also includes
a historical analysis of the admissibility of proof of subsequent remedial
measures and an analysis of the relationship of "scientific unknowa-
bility" to evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
ANALYSIS OF ADMSSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
EVIDENCE
Evidence of subsequent remedial measures has been always inad-
missible to establish negligence or to show culpable conduct.4 Federal
Rule of Evidence 407, to which the vast majority of jurisdictions adhere,
codifies this common law rule.' Several reasons justify this rule. First,
2. Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 499 So. 2d 344, 348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
3. Chief Justice Dixon and Justice Calogero joined Justice Watson for a three
member plurality. Justices Dennis and Marcus concurred.
4. Comment, The Case for the Renovated Repair Rule: Admission of Evidence of
Subsequent Repairs Against the Mass Producer in Strict Products Liability, 29 Am. U.L.
Rev. 135, 137, 147 n.41 (1979); 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 3.0413]
(1987).
5. Comment, Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures Evidence in Diversity
Actions Based in Strict Products Liability, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1485, 1486 nn.7-8 (1985).
Maine alone has adopted a policy of admitting subsequent repairs evidence to show
negligence. See Me. R. Evid. 407(a).
Fed. R. Evid. 407 reads:
When, after an event, measures are taken which if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
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exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures encourages people to take
steps to further safety, or, at least, does not discourage the taking of
such steps. 6 Second, such evidence is considered logically irrelevant to
the issue of negligence, since the subsequent act is not to be regarded
as an admission of antecedent negligence. 7 Commentators have elaborated
on this, characterizing subsequent remedial measures evidence as "log-
ically irrelevant because what occurs prior to the injury, not afterwards,
determines whether there has been a culpable breach of duty." 8 The
irrelevancy stems from a possible multiplicity of causation, since a
defendant's later improvements may be based on aesthetic, functional,
or economic reasons unrelated to the issue of negligence. 9 Finally, the
evidence may unfairly prejudice the defendant '" because it confuses the
jury as to its purpose and might be considered by the jury as an
admission of negligence by the defendant."
Historically, courts also uniformly excluded evidence of subsequent
remedial measures in strict products liability, since the policy rationale
for excluding the evidence is the same under both theories.12 However,
the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control,
or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeached.
6. Comment, FRE 407 & Its State Variations: The Courts Perform Some "Subsequent
Remedial Measures" of Their Own in Products Liability Cases, 49 UMKC L. Rev. 338
(1981). See also Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 Rutgers L. Rev.
574, 590-91 (1955): "The tenable basis for exclusion is, therefore, not lack of probative
worth, but the impact of an extrinsic social policy, that of encouraging, or not discouraging,
the taking of immediate steps to prevent further harm ... "
For Louisiana cases adopting this position, see infra note 42.
7. Comment, supra note 6, at 338. For Louisiana cases supporting this position,
see infra note 46.
8. Comment, supra note 6, at 338.
9. Comment, supra note 4, at 149; Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d
113, 125, 528 P.2d 1148, 1155-56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 820-21 (1974) (Clark, J., dissenting).
See also, Fed. R. Evid. 407, comment (b).
10. Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983);
Haysom v. Coleman Lantern, 573 P.2d 785, 791 (Wash. 1978); Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 125,
528 P.2d at 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21 (Clark, J., dissenting).
I. Grenada, 695 F.2d at 888; Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 131-34,
417 N.E.2d 545, 554-55, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 259-61 (1981) (Jasen, J., dissenting). See also,
R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 194, n.15 (2d ed. 1982).
12. R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 193. See also Werner v. Upjohn
Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S. Ct. 862 (1981):
[I]f the common law and Congress were willing to exclude the evidence on
the issue of culpable conduct, the result should be no different on policy grounds
as long as strict liability is not distinguishable on some other ground .... We
concede the obvious distinction between negligence and strict liability [that
reasonableness is not at issue], but we do not believe that this distinction should
produce a different result. The rationale behind Rule 407 is that people in
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beginning with Ault v. International Harvester,3 courts nationwide reev-
aluated whether this exclusion in strict products liability attained desired
social policies of compensating victims and encouraging product safety
reform. Subsequently, many state jurisdictions reversed themselves and
admitted this evidence, holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply
to strict products liability since the litigation centers on the product,
not manufacturer negligence or culpability. 4 Arguing that this distinction
meant that negligence and strict products liability are not analogous,' 5
advocates of admissibility of subsequent remedial measures evidence have
general would be less likely to take subsequent remedial measures if their repairs
or improvements would be used against them in a lawsuit arising out of prior
accidents. By excluding this evidence defendants are encouraged to make such
improvements. It is difficult to understand why this policy should apply any
differently where the complaint is based on strict liability as well as negligence.
Id. at 857.
13. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974). The plaintiff was
riding in an International Harvester Scout which veered off the road and plunged into
a canyon, allegedly because of a failure in its aluminum gear box. The plaintiff wished
to introduce evidence that subsequent to this injury the defendant replaced aluminum
Scout gearboxes with iron ones, in order to show that the aluminum gearbox was defective.
The California Supreme Court held that the evidence was admissible to prove the existence
of a defect. No policy factors prevented this admission because the policy exclusion of
subsequent remedial measures in negligence actions did not analogously apply in cases of
strict liability. The California Supreme Court reasoned that mass manufacturers of thou-
sands of units of a product would take remedial measures to avoid greater future liability
regardless of the admissibility of the evidence.
To note the trend of jurisdictions adopting this policy, see generally infra note 14. See
also 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 4, at § 3.04[3].
14. Comment, supra note 5, at 1487 n.ll.
Arguably, this relevance is only a function of product liability's underlying policies of
fostering victim compensation, spreading risk among large numbers, reducing the cost of
administering accident cases, and deterring accidents. Comment, supra note 4, at 135-36.
For lists of policies underlying products liability, see Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 118 (La. 1986); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90
N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); Prosser & Keeton On Torts 692-94 (5th ed. 1984).
Another factor which supports relevancy is that it allows a plaintiff in failure to warn
and design defect cases to prove manufacturer knowledge or feasibility of warning with
greater ease than in traditional negligence suits, where those issues are difficult if not
impossible to substantiate. This again fosters victim recovery. See Lugenbuhl, Contem-
porary Problems in Maritime Products Liability, 45 La. L. Rev. 859, 861 (1985); Prosser
& Keeton On Torts 695-96; Green, Strict Liability Under 402A & 402B: A Decade of
Litigation, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1185, 1189 (1976); Comment, Design Defects: Are Consumer
Expectations Unrealistic?, 45 La. L. Rev. 1313, 1314 (1985).
15. R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 193-94; Comment, Products Liability
and Evidence of Subsequent Repair, 1972 Duke L.J. 837, 846-48 (1972); Comment, supra
note 4, at 138-39. Negligence and products liability cases are distinguishable in two ways.
First, strict products liability is different because the focus of liability stems from the
product, not from reasonableness or culpable conduct. Second, the rule in products liability
affects the substantive law of products liability, while it does not do so in negligence.
NOTES
asserted that assumptions forming the basis for exclusion in strict lia-
bility, primarily that admission of such evidence prevents safety reform,
are manifestly erroneous. 16 They have contended that admitting, not
excluding, evidence of subsequent remedial measures actually encourages
repairs. 17 Under their analysis, mass manufacturers of defective products
must take action to repair because of the threat of immense economic
liability from thousands of products liability lawsuits and the social
liability from adverse publicity of such litigation. 8
Courts nationwide have also reassessed the logical and legal relevance
of this evidence to the issues of products liability, developing narrow
exceptions to the general exclusionary rule. Initially, courts have rec-
ognized that exceptions exist within Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and
its state counterparts. These exceptions allow admissibility of subsequent
repair evidence where ownership, control or feasibility are controverted
by the defendant.' 9 Other narrow exceptions have developed within this
framework, including the admission of this evidence to prove prior
notice, knowledge, or for impeachment purposes.20 In each case, the
evidence is probative of the validity of the defendant's denial, yet is
always subject to exclusion if it unduly prejudices the defendant.
Conversely, some courts have adopted the Ault analysis in which
the exclusionary rule has no application to products liability. In those
jurisdictions, this evidence is not only probative of collateral issues, but
also of the ultimate issue of a product's defectiveness because the ev-
idence reflects appropriate safety standards for products and the defen-
16. Comment, supra note 15, at 848. "[Tlhe 'public policy' assumptions justifying this
evidentiary rule are no longer valid." Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117
Cal. Rptr. at 815.
17. Comment, supra note 15, at 848.
18. Id. at 848-50. "[Tlhe repairs may be mandated by government agencies; the
prospect of repeated liability claims will make immediate repairs the less costly alternative
whatever the litigation costs; or, and perhaps most importantly, the danger that unfavorable
publicity will interfere with the sales of non-defective products." R. Lempert & S. Saltz-
burg, supra note 11, at 194 n.5.
See also, Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 113, 528 P.2d at 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816; Robbins
v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793-94 (8th Cir. 1977); Farner
v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 527 (8th Cir. 1977).
19. See supra note 5. Fed. R. Evid. 407, as interpreted by the majority of federal
jurisdictions, applies to strict products liability, thereby generally excluding subsequent
repairs evidence, but recognizing limited exceptions of ownership, control, or feasibility
if any of the issues are raised by the defendant. See also Comment, supra note 15, at
841-42.
20. The exceptions of Fed. R. Evid. 407 are merely illustrative. As such, other
exceptions have developed within that framework. See Fed. R. Evid. 407, Advisory Comm.
Notes. See also Comment, supra note 4, at 151-53.
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dant's ability to adopt them. 21 These Ault-type jurisdictions, where no
exclusionary rule exists, must be distinguished from those which adopt
an exclusionary rule for products liability, but maintain exceptions to
it.
While a trend toward admissibility of subsequent remedial measures
exists, opinions remain mixed as to both relevancy and policy. 22 Main-
taining the argument of multiplicity of causation to disprove the relevancy
of this evidence, commentators have reasserted the need for exclusion
of such evidence in order to expedite socially optimal product reform. 23
These rebuttals contend that the mere use of this evidence, regardless
of under what theory or issue it is admitted, represses any inclination
to make subsequent improvements or repairs. 24 Others have argued that
the Ault standard erroneously assumes manufacturers act in an idealistic
market setting, when, in fact, they do not. 25 Personal motives of cor-
porate managers to "play deep ' 26 and to maximize short-term profits
actually make it marginally optimal to ignore product reform. Thus a
manufacturer is motivated to leave the product in its current state, rather
than risk an admission of defect by implementing product improve-
ments. 
2 7
With neither strong empirical evidence nor consistent jurisprudential
analysis to corroborate either position, the issue of admissibility of
subsequent remedial measures has remained unresolved. Because of the
multiplicity of causes of accidents involving products, it is difficult to
find empirical evidence to support the policy of admissibility. Some
empirical evidence exists to prove the efficacy of exclusion, yet the data
often lacks persuasiveness. 2 Likewise, Federal Rule of Evidence 407
21. R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note II, at 194: To prove the existence of a
defect, "the plaintiff must usually show that some alternative way of manufacture or
design was both safer and feasible. A subsequent improvement is highly probative on
both these points. . . . [A] business is not likely to change a product unless the change
promotes safety and is feasible." See also Comment, supra note 15, at 846-47.
22. Comment, supra note 6, at 342-47.
23. Henderson, Products Liability & the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of the
Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 765, 789 (1983).
24. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980).
25. Henderson, supra note 23, at 766.
26. Id. "'[Dleep play' refers to the tendency of corporations and corporate managers
to defer taking action that would enhance the safety of their products and thereby reduce
their aggregate liability exposure, even though the costs appear to be outweighed by the
benefits of taking such action." Id. at 766 n.3.
27. Id. at 765.
28. Id. at 777-80. Henderson uses two examples, asbestos and DDT, which offer
some empirical proof as to the efficiency of the exclusion in products liability, but it is
doubtful that other products would be treated similarly unless the dangers presented by
those products were as significant. See also Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen
Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 1983).
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offers no solution because of its susceptibility to conflicting interpre-
tations in the various federal districts. 29
The Dilemma of the Federal Courts
In Grenada Steel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen Co.,30 the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the lack of uniformity on
the issue of the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures. The Fifth Circuit followed the path taken by the Second, Third,
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, and held such evidence inadmissible under
Rule 407 to prove the existence of a defect in strict products liability.3'
Justification for this position rested not only on policy factors, but,
more heavily, on the irrelevancy of subsequent remedial measures to
the issue of defect.32 The court asserted that arguments on such evidence's
probative nature are "based on little direct evidence of why manufac-
turers make product changes." 33 The court continued, decrying reliance
on "undocumented assumptions about how evidence of such changes
might affect litigation. '3 4 The court focused on the mysterious nature
of industry actions, stating:
A priori judgments concerning why manufacturers do or do not
alter their products, made by such dubious experts as judges,
lawyers, and law professors, suffer from excessive reliance on
logical deduction and surmise without the benefit of evidence
of industry practice or economic factors .... We cannot really
know why changes are made by industry generally or why a
change was made in a particular product in the absence of
evidence on the question.35
The court also based exclusion on the jury confusion created by such
evidence.3 6 Hence, the court reasoned that even had the evidence been
29. No conformity is found on Fed. R. Evid. 407's application in the federal district
or appellate courts. For a discussion and examples, see infra notes 39-41.
30. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
31. Id. at 888. See Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 960, 102 S. Ct. 2036 (1982); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985
(3d Cir. 1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980); Bauman v. Volk-
swagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980). After Grenada the Seventh,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits adopted this rule. See Probus v. K-Mart, 794 F.2d 1207 (7th
Cir. 1986); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986); Moe v. Avions Marcel
Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853, 105 S.
Ct. 176 (1984).
32. Grenada, 695 F.2d at 888.
33. Id. at 887-88.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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relevant under Rule 407, the danger of confusion would have outweighed
the probative value sufficiently to justify exclusion based on Rule 403. 37
This is especially true where manufacturer knowledge may be proven
by alternative methods which are less confusing and more probative on
the issue.3"
The Grenada court noted that the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held
that Rule 407 has no applicability for excluding this evidence in strict
products liability.3 9 Similarly, many state courts have followed the Ault
and Eighth Circuit rationale, holding that such evidence is admissible
in strict products liability.4 In response, the Fifth Circuit in Grenada
argued that certain exceptions exist under Rule 407 when a defendant
attempts to affirmatively use this evidence, but that generally Rule 407
still excludes subsequent repair evidence in strict liability. Hence, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the Ault and Eighth Circuit position, instead
recognizing the applicability of the exclusionary rule to products liability,
along with its limited exceptions. 4'
The Louisiana Position
Prior to Toups, Louisiana's jurisprudential position has been clearly against
admission of subsequent remedial measures evidence in negligence actions. 42
37. Id.
Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
38. See Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 124-28, 528 P.2d at 1154-57, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 819-21
(Clark, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 6, at 341.
39. Grenada, 695 F.2d at 888.
40. Id. at 887 n.5. See also, Comment, supra note 5, at 1487 n.1l.
41. Grenada, 695 F.2d at 888-89. The position taken by the majority of federal
circuits is that Fed. R. Evid. 407 applies to exclude this evidence in products liability,
yet certain exceptions exist when controverted by the defendant. Thus, if the defendant
does not raise the issue, the court may not use the exception to admit the evidence. For
an excellent discussion of grounds for exclusion, see Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures
in Strict Liability: Later Opinions as Evidence of Defects in Earlier Reasoning, 32 Cath.
U.L. Rev. 895, 918-20 (1983); S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence
Manual 162-63 (2d ed. 1977).
42. For a complete list of Louisiana cases excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in negligence, in addition to the four discussed in the text, see Boudreaux v.
Exxon Co., USA, 451 So. 2d 85, 90 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 119
(1984); Esta v. Dover Corp. 385 So. 2d 439, 448 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
392 So. 2d 690 (1980); Lea v. Baumann Surgical Supplies, 321 So. 2d 844, 856 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ denied, 325 So. 2d 279 (1976); Hadrick v. Diaz, 302 So.
2d 345, 351 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d
331, 333 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 275 So. 2d 791 (1973); Nichols v. Green
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Four cases exemplify Louisiana's prohibition. 3  In Givens v.
De Soto Bldg. Co.,44 Mr. Givens fell on an unlighted step in a theater.
Nothing was present to caution patrons of the potential hazard. After
the injury, the Desoto Building Company lighted the area. The Givens
court held the evidence of the subsequent repair inadmissible to prove
negligence because of the policy of encouraging remedial action. The
court explained that such an admission would operate "as a confession
that [the defendant] was guilty of prior wrong"; thus admission was
improper since it would prevent society from taking advantage of new
information, profiting from experience, and implementing remedial meas-
ures.
45
In Currier v. Saenger Theaters Corp.,46 Mrs. Currier fell down
unrailed stairs in the Saenger Theater because the stairs were too steep
and the carpet was badly worn. No warning existed to caution persons
using the stairs of the danger of tripping. After Mrs. Currier's injury,
the stairs were railed and the carpet replaced. The court held that the
evidence of these changes was inadmissible because the acts were without
probative value to prove antecedent negligence.
In Gauche v. Ford Motor Co. , 4 Mrs. Gauche was injured when
the brakes on the family's 1965 Lincoln Continental overheated and
failed because of a low grade brake fluid. Later in the year, Ford
recalled all 1965 Continentals and changed the brake fluid and lines.
On rehearing, the court clarified its basis for findings of defect for
redhibitory purposes and fault for negligence. The Gauche court, re-
Acres Rest Home, 245 So. 2d 544, 547 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Pitre v. Employers
Liability Assurance Corp., 234 So. 2d 847, 851 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 237 So.
2d 398 (1970); McDaniel v. Welsh, 234 So. 2d 833, 841 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 237 So. 2d 397 (1970); Devore v. La. & Ark. Ry Co., 178 So. 706 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1938).
Louisiana has twice recognized exceptions to exclusion, but only in dicta. In Coco v.
Winston Indus., 330 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), rev'd as to quantum, 341 So.
2d 332 (1977), the court noted error in admitting such evidence to prove feasibility
for negligence purposes. However, the court concluded that the evidence was superfluous
to proving the defendant's negligence because so much other evidence of negligence existed
that admission of the evidence was harmless. Hence, the subsequent remedial measures
evidence was dispositive of nothing. Id. at 659.
Also, in Gauche v. Ford Motor Co., 226 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), the
court rhetorically questioned whether or not such evidence could be admitted for cor-
roboration of other evidence of negligence. Any idea of an exception created by this
language, however, is removed by the court in Trahan, 273 So. 2d at 333. See also
sources cited infra in notes 59-60.
43. See proposed La. Code Evid. art. 407, comment (a) (West 1987).
44. 156 La. 377, 100 So. 534 (1924).
45. Id. at 380, 100 So. at 535.
46. 10 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
47. 226 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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turning to the analysis of Givens, held that evidence of the recall and
fluid change could not be used to prove negligence or actionable fault,
asserting that such a policy would prevent future remedial measures. 48
Finally, Galloway v. Employers Mutual49 involved an exposed, worn
gear of a machine. While cleaning the gear, Mr. Galloway's pants became
caught in the gear's treads. His penis was traumatically and totally
amputated within a matter of seconds. To prove his employer's negligence
for failure to remedy the defect and prevent the injury, Mr. Galloway
offered evidence that the gear was later covered by a protective metal
plate. The court gave no analysis for its exclusion, stating only that it
believed the evidence "to have been properly withheld from the jury." 5
Following the traditional view that products liability and negligence
are analogous, Louisiana courts have applied these principles to strict
products liability, holding that evidence of subsequent remedial measures
is inadmissible to prove the existence of a defect.5 In Landry v. Adam, 2
the fourth circuit held evidence of a recall letter and subsequent brake
system repair logically irrelevant to prove the existence of a defect in
a products liability suit, and, therefore, inadmissible.53 The fourth circuit
also rejected the evidence because of the potential unfair prejudice to
the defendant, as well as because admission of this evidence would have
been contrary to a policy of encouraging repair.14
In Lovell v. Earl Grissmer Co.," the first circuit joined the fourth
circuit, rejecting evidence offered to prove the existence of a defect in
products liability. The plaintiff had sought to introduce evidence of the
defendant's post-accident modification to a power service cord and ad-
dition of a warning to an electrical washing device. The first circuit
maintained that this evidence was not logically relevant since it had no
probative value as to proof of a defect, nor was it legally relevant since
it raised undue inferences of the defendant's guilt. 6 That court again
rejected subsequent remedial measures evidence in Smith v. Formica
Corp. '7 where evidence of a post-accident federal regulatory change in
the use of a linoleum adhesive was ruled irrelevant to a determination
48. Id. at 211.
49. 286 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 333 (1974).
50. Id. at 682.
51. Prior to Toups, the Louisiana Supreme Court never addressed the admissibility
of subsequent remedial measures evidence in products liability and only scarcely in neg-
ligence, uniformly denying writs whenever applied.
52. 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
53. Id. at 595-96.
54. Id.
55. 422 So. 2d 1344 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
56. Id. at 1348-49.
57. 439 So. 2d 1194, 1200 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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of whether a product was unreasonably dangerous. Similarly, the third
circuit rejected such evidence as both logically and legally irrelevant in
Fontenot v. H. Hollier & Sons, Inc.,8 where it was offered to prove
whether a product was unreasonably dangerous.
Consonantly, Louisiana courts have refused to recognize other ex-
ceptions which have developed, such as those in the federal courts, and
maintained an absolute exclusion of all such evidence. In their rejection,
Louisiana courts have excluded remedial measures evidence for its lack
of probative value on other products liability issues and for its prejudicial
effect. In Mobley v. General Motors Corp. 9 Mr. Mobley presented
evidence that subsequent to his accident, which occurred when trying
to fit a 16 inch tire onto a 16.5 inch rim, General Motors added warnings
which would have cautioned him and prevented the accident. Although
Mr. Mobley did not introduce the evidence to prove defect, he did offer
it to prove feasibility of warning and to impeach the defendant's expert
witness. The third circuit rejected the evidence for both purposes, holding
that Louisiana did not recognize those exceptions to the general exclu-
sionary rule. The court also questioned the Ault analysis of admissibility
for subsequent remedial measures evidence, which it considered logically
and legally irrelevant 0 The fourth circuit in Toups likewise found no
grounds for admissibility of subsequent remedial measures evidence to
prove manufacturer knowledge or feasibility.6
ANALYSIS OF Toups v. Sears
In Toups, the Louisiana Supreme Court purports to resolve the
question of Louisiana's position on the admissibility of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures by adopting proposed Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 407 and by citing jurisprudence consistent with this
principle. Finding that the policy considerations which justify the ex-
clusionary rule in negligence do not impede the actions of manufacturers
in products liability, the court contended that this admissibility does not
discourage remedial efforts because manufacturers may employ the de-
fense of scientific unknowability to dispel any inferences of actual knowl-
edge or feasibility created by evidence of subsequent remedial measures. 62
58. 478 So. 2d 1379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, sub nom. LaFleur v.
John-Deere, 491 So. 2d 624 (La. 1986). See infra notes 86-91.
59. 482 So. 2d 1056 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 871 (La. 1986).
60. Id. at 1062. See also dicta in Fontenot, 478 So. 2d at 1388.
61. Toups, 499 So. 2d at 348.
62. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 817.
'[A]ny discouragement to produce new products or to discover safety improvements
will be mitigated by the manufacturer's ability to defend failure to warn cases, alternative
design cases, and alternative product cases on the basis of scientific unknowaility and
inability."' Id., quoting Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 118
(La. 1986).
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The court argued that where manufacturer knowledge and feasibility are
at issue, "evidence of such remedial measures should be allowed insofar
as they are relevant in establishing what the manufacturer knew or
should have known at the time of the injury. '63 Thus the court concluded
that this evidence should be admitted in limited instances in "the products
liability field when credibility and precautionary measures, i.e. warnings
and/or alternative designs are at issue." ' 64
Problems with Proposed Article 407
The Toups court justifies this policy largely by use of proposed
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407,65 which is almost identical to
its federal counterpart. 66 The article, however, neither makes a specific
attempt to address or resolve the issue of admissibility, 67 nor is it law. 6
Deferring to the courts on whether products liability in Louisiana em-
braces any concept of culpable conduct, comment (d) states that article
407 applies only if the litigation is based on negligence or culpable
conduct. Consequently, when the Toups court says the exclusionary rule
does not apply because of the Ault and Eighth Circuit rationale, it
63. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 816-17. This analysis is identical to that of the Ault court
and would, if not qualified, suggest that the Toups court adopts the Ault position of
inapplicability of Rule 407 to exclude this evidence in products liability. However, other
language of the Toups opinion limits that suggestion. The Toups court qualifies the areas
of admissibility to only those exceptions listed within Rule 407. Consequently, the court
interprets the rule to have general applicability to strict products liability, with some
exceptions. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 816. Whether the court will expand this position and
hold the exclusionary rule inapplicable in strict products liability cases remains unclear.
In Toups, because Sears controverted the feasibility of the alternative design, the court
applied the rule and admitted the evidence under an exception.
64. Id. at 818. This is, however, a questionable assumption. See supra notes 6-12,
30-40 and accompanying text.
65. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 816-17.
66. See supra note 5. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 407 is substantially the same as
the federal rule, except that "article" is "rule" and "impeachment" is "attacking cred-
ibility." Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 407, comment (b) (West 1987).
67. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 407, comment (d) (West 1987).
The Toups court interprets the article analogously to the Grenada opinion and remains
consistent with the exclusionary rule so often adopted, merely recognizing limited exceptions
when the issue is raised by the defendant. The opinion, however, arguably could be
expanded to recognize non-applicability of the exclusionary rule to strict products liability.
See Toups, 507 So. 2d at 816: "The policy considerations which exclude evidence of
remedial measures in negligence cases are not applicable where strict liability is involved."
See also infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
68. Both the House (H.R. 1021, 13th Reg. Sess. (1987)) and Senate (S. 554, 13th
Reg. Sess (1987)) versions of the proposed code of evidence were indefinitely postponed
for future study. See respectively the hearings on the proposed La. Code Evid., House
Comm. on Civil Law and Procedure (May 4, 1987); Senate Comm., Judiciary A (May
4, 1987).
NOTES
alludes to their interpretation that the exclusionary rule has no application
in products liability because neither negligence nor culpability are at
issue. Despite this inference, other language in the opinion and the
court's application of proposed article 407 laudably suggests an inter-
pretation in line with the Fifth Circuit's, in which the rule applies to
products liability, but provides exceptions when certain issues are con-
troverted by the defendant. However, which interpretation the court
endorses is unclear.
The cases cited in comment (a) of article 407 offer no support for
an admission of subsequent remedial measures evidence in products
liability, despite comment (a)'s statement that "this article is in accord
with prior Louisiana jurisprudence. "6 9 Close analysis of the cited juris-
prudence reveals that the comment which the court emphatically quotes
for corroboration7 0 is wrong. Only the first sentence of the rule, per-
taining to the exclusion of such evidence in negligence actions finds
support from earlier jurisprudence. The second sentence, which pertains
to exceptions to the exclusionary rule, finds no jurisprudential corrob-
oration in Louisiana, merely reflecting a proposed legislative draft. Con-
sequently, no Louisiana jurisprudential support exists for the interpretation
of proposed article 407 which the Toups court suggests. 7'
The Fallacy of Ault
The Toups court adopts Ault's standard without consideration of
the validity of its basic policy premise.72 Indeed, Ault's analysis does
not withstand scrutiny. Since the idea of liability, regardless of whether
brought in negligence, strict liability, or on any other theory, inhibits
remedial actions, admission of subsequent remedial measures evidence
curtails rather than encourages safety incentives. The admission of ev-
idence of subsequent remedial measures allowed by the Toups opinion
means manufacturers "will avoid making some marginal improvements,
69. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 407, comment (a) (West 1987).
70. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 817.
71. See sources cited supra notes 42-56. These cases support only the proposition
that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct. They do not purport to allow admissibility in any other instance.
However, even if the issue of admissibility in products liability had not been addressed
by prior products liability jurisprudence, logic would require a result consonant with the
factually similar negligence jurisprudence such as Gauche v. Ford Motor Co., 226 So. 2d
198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), and Galloway v. Employers' Mutual, 286 So. 2d 676 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 333 (1984), which would be grounded
in products liability today, as well as other products liability cases such as Landry v.
Adam, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), and Mobley v. General Motors Corp.,
482 So. 2d 1056 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 871 (1986).
72. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 818,
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even if otherwise cost-effective, because of the possible negative impli-
cations for tort claims [under failure to warn and design defect] involving
older designs." 73
This threat of liability fosters the tendency of manufacturers to play
deep; other factors contemporaneously buttress this tendency. One factor
is the impact of lengthy delays in trials and the resulting high discount
rates which decrease actual loss. 74 Another factor is the possibility of
government intervention in the form of a subsidy to defray the cost of
liability defense, or in the form of remedial legislation to retroactively
bar suits not yet filed. 75 Finally, Ault's assumptions about economic
behavior are distorted when corporate managers pursue individual mo-
tives. Since these managers are judged on short-term results, they may
defer taking action, assuming that rewards are based on the short-run
benefits obtained from their deferral tactics. The fears of repercussions
are insignificant since the manager relies on the bureaucratic corporate
structure to promote him to another position, possibly with another
corporation, before the long-term implications materialize. Reasonably
believing he will escape most, if not all, of the blame for the losses
eventually incurred, the corporate manager distorts the idealistic regime
upon which the Ault theory depends.7 6
The Ault opinion is premised on the character of the defendant manufac-
turer as a contemporary, corporate mass producer of tens of thousands of
units of goods whose objective, non-personal nature make it immune from the
impact of any potential litigation which would impair its desire to repair.77 Be-
cause the ultimate stakes are so high, these large players will act optimally
to minimize long-run losses. The premise, however, fails to consider the
actions of the numerous smaller manufacturers whose long-term prospects
become highly suspect when faced with the losses of a single short-term
products liability suit. Thus, while the premise, at least theoretically,
may not inhibit large manufacturers such as Sears from acting optimally
and taking remedial actions, the implications are devastating to smaller
manufacturers such as the De Soto Building Company in Givens and
the Earl Grissmer Company in Lovell. Because they cannot absorb the
short-term impact of a single loss which evidence of subsequent remedial
measures might cause, they will avoid remedial action. 7s
73. Henderson, supra note 23, at 774.
74. Id. at 776.
75. Id. at 776-77.
76. Id. at 781-82.
77. R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 193; Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528
P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816; Comment, supra note 15, at 848.
78. The theory of Ault apparently rests not on the theory of the plaintiff's case in
negligence or strict liability, but on the nature of the defendant as a mass manufacturer
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Problems with Scientific Unknowability
In Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,79 the Louisiana Supreme
Court elaborated on four theories of products liability. s0 The Halphen
court maintained that incentives for manufacturers to repair and innovate
were not lost when manufacturer knowledge and feasibility were put at
issue in failure to warn and design defect cases because of the ability
of defendant manufacturers to assert the defense of scientific unknow-
ability."' Similarly, the Toups court recognized that this defense refutes
the same inferences in failure to warn and design defect cases when
created by evidence of subsequent remedial measures. Hence, the court
reasoned, admission of subsequent repair evidence should not discourage
remedial actions. 82
The assertion of the Toups court that admitting subsequent remedial
measures evidence will not discourage remedial actions is severely limited,
however, by defendants' inability to assert the defense of scientific
unknowability in the Halphen "per se" and "manufacture or compo-
sition" theories. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Halphen stated that
knowledge is not relevant under those theories.83 Furthermore, this as-
sertion fails to recognize the reality that manufacturers will not implement
product reform because of the difficulty a plaintiff will have in proving
what was actually known absent such a remedial measure. 84
and the necessity of management to institute changes because of economics. Hence, under
the Ault analysis a plaintiff should be able to introduce the evidence in any suit so long
as the defendant is a mass manufacturer. See Note, supra note 41, at 896 n.9.
79. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
80. Id. at 114-15. For a discussion of the four theories see Crawford, Developments
in the Law, 1985-1986-Torts, 47 La. L. Rev. 485 (1986); Note, Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.-A New Product in the Area of Products Liability, 47 La. L. Rev.
637 (1987).
81. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 118.
82. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 817.
83. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 114-15. The Halphen court explained that evidence of
knowledge or feasibility is not relevant in "per se" and "manufacture or composition"
categories; thus, scientific unknowability is not a defense. Nevertheless, a plaintiff could
attempt to use subsequent remedial measures evidence to prove defect.
See also, Caprara, 52 N.Y.2d at 128-30, 417 N.E. 2d at 552-54, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 258-
59.
84. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d A.2d 539 (1982).
The court voiced doubts concerning the definability of "undiscoverable knowledge" and
the determination at any given time of technologically discoverable knowledge. Because
of "complicated, costly, confusing, and time-consuming" evidence, the court stated that
"vast confusion ... is virtually certain to arise from any attempt to deal in a trial setting
with the concept of scientific knowability." Thus, the court advocated "avoiding the
concept altogether by striking the state-of-the-art defense." Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
For problems involving the concept of "scientific unknowability," see Keeton, The
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Distinguishing LaFleur
The Toups court relies heavily on LaFleur v. John Deere,5 which
it cites as authoritative on the admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures. 6 However, LaFleur does not pertain to this issue. In LaFleur,
a grain drill which planted seed malfunctioned, resulting in the loss of
much of the plaintiffs' crop. The plaintiffs brought a products liability
claim based on design defect to recover lost profits and consequential
emotional damages. To prove the drill's defective design, and the man-
ufacturer's and vendor's knowledge of that defect, the plaintiffs sought
to introduce a video tape of their agricultural engineering expert adjusting
the grain drill. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that since there was
no audio and since the plaintiffs' expert was available at trial for full
cross-examination, no prejudice occurred.8 7
The issue of subsequent remedial measures evidence, however, was
not before the LaFleur court. The defendants did not appeal the ad-
missibility of the two objects which the third circuit8 labeled "subsequent
remedial measures," a service bulletin to customers and an operator's
manual addition which warned of the need for adjustment, because in
this situation neither was a post-accident remedial measure. The third
circuit held "neither the service information bulletin nor the operator's
manual [were] evidence of post-sale or post-injury modifications," 8 9
hence, they were not excludable under the subsequent remedial measures
rule. Likewise, the third circuit did not consider the video to be a
remedial measure within the scope of the rule because it was an act
undertaken by a third person, not the defendant. 90 Consequently, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in the LaFleur opinion never addressed the
issue of subsequent remedial measures.
As LaFleur is inapplicable, neither logic nor Louisiana's prior ju-
risprudence supports an Ault policy of admissibility in products liability.9'
Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principals, 45 Mo. L.
Rev. 579, 594-95 (1980); J. Beasley, Products Liability & the Unreasonably Dangerous
Requirement § 393 (1981).
85. 491 So. 2d 624 (La. 1986).
86. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 816.
87. LaFleur, 491 So. 2d at 632.
88. Fontenot v. F. Hollier & Sons, 478 So. 2d 1379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 1388.
90. This reflects another type of subsequent remedial measure that falls outside the
policy considerations of the rule. Since non-defendants are not subject to liability, remedial
measures by such persons are not affected by the rule. They are, however, less probative
of issues of knowledge.
91. See Landry v. Adam, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). See also Gauche
v. Ford Motor Co., 226 So. 2d 198, 211 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), quoting Givens v.
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Where a remedial act will be construed against a defendant, whether
as an admission of defect or on some other issue, no remedial action
will be taken, regardless of the applicable theory of liability. No statutory
rule dictates admissibility, and proposed Code of Evidence article 407
cannot be deemed corroborating.
Limiting Toups
The Toups holding could be interpreted consistently with the bulk
of Louisiana jurisprudence which excludes this evidence in products
liability just as in negligence. The opinion stands merely for the prop-
osition that Louisiana has begun to recognize the existence of certain
limited exceptions to the rule of exclusion. 92 However, the holdings of
the jurisprudence that the Toups court cites 93 suggest that such a lim-
itation may not be proper. Those opinions suggest that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to strict products liability because neither negligence
nor culpable conduct are at issue. They do not suggest a general ex-
clusionary rule with limited exceptions.9 4 Consequently, the danger arises
that a future court will use this jurisprudence to justify a holding
inconsistent with the wording and application of the exclusionary rule
in Toups. Specifically, a court might hold that the rule has no application
De Soto Bldg. Co., 156 La. 377, 380, 100 So. 534, 535 (1924):
True policy and sound reason require that men should be encouraged to improve,
or repair, and not be deterred from it by the fear that if they do so their acts
will be construed into an admission that they had been wrongdoers. A rule,
which so operates as to deter men from profiting by experience and availing
themselves of new information, has nothing to commend it, for it is neither
expedient nor just.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 42-59. The Toups court used the evidence to
prove knowledge of Sears, feasibility of warning, and knowledge, and to impeach the
credibility of Sears' expert witness.
An interesting point is that courts regularly ascertain feasibility of warning as the Toups
court did. See, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980). While feasibility
of precautionary measures seems acceptable, any analysis of the feasibility of a "warning"
appears improper. Because any warning will have minimal impact on the utility of a
product, while contemporaneously decreasing probabilities of harm, the warning will always
be feasible unless, the possible harm is greatly insignificant. Hence, any question of
feasibility of warning will be resolved affirmatively. For an excellent discussion, see A.
Winstien, A. Twerski, H. Picker & W. Donaher, Products Liability & the Reasonably
Safe Product 62-63 (1978). See also, Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 238 n.1,
432 A.2d 925, 930 n.1 (1981).
93. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 816.
94. The following courts held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to strict
products liability and did not recognize a general rule with limited exceptions: Farner v.
Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal
Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977); Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir.
1980); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1974).
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in strict products liability, and not that the rule applies but has excep-
tions.
Additionally, the Toups opinion suggests that the admissibility ex-
ceptions are not limited to failure to warn and design defect products
liability cases, or to merely those issues contained in proposed article
407. Instead, the exceptions to the rule of admissibility may become
applicable in all theories of strict liability law. 95 In a Loescher v. Parr9 6
type case, a subsequent repair might be offered to prove an unreasonably
dangerous condition for strict liability purposes. An example suggested
would be a highly polished floor, covered with a rug that could slip
from underneath a passerby. Removal of the rug after a slip could be
used to prove the existence of the unreasonable dangerous condition in
the house, a condition within the scope of liability imposed by Civil
Code article 2317. Likewise, in a Holland v. Buckley97 type case, a
subsequent act to contain or control a vicious animal would suggest
ownership or control, thereby supplying the perhaps otherwise unknown
defendant. The remedial act could be used against the good Samaritan
to attack his credibility and prevent his denial of ownership. Admissibility
of subsequent remedial measures evidence deters remedial acts in any
of these situations, thus increasing the likelihood of further injury.
Ultimately, a reassessment of Ault is required, as its essential ingredient,
a large corporate defendant able to optimally spread risks and losses,
is replaced by the marginally solvent actor.
CONCLUSION
The Toups court answers the question of admissibility of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures by recognizing exceptions to the ex-
clusionary rule. However, it is unclear whether the Toups opinion will
be employed to adopt a much broader policy of extending the admis-
sibility of such evidence to strict liability. The holding undermines dec-
ades of prior jurisprudence and manifests a belief that admission not
only has probative value toward relevant issues in products liability
without prejudicing defendants, but also has desirable policy effects of
encouraging manufacturers to repair and create safer products. The
defense of scientific unknowability exists in these cases, allowing a
defendant a means to dispel the inferences of knowledge created by
such evidence. Because of its limited application to only two theories
of products liability and its complex nature, however, this defense will
not prevent manufacturers from being discouraged from taking remedial
95. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 816.
96. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
97. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
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action. Additionally, the defense offers no protection for defendants in
strict liability cases outside of products liability who may be attacked
by evidence of their subsequent remedial action. Both the probative
value of subsequent remedial action evidence and the ability of the
Toups holding to expedite its desired policy of social reform remain
suspect. Little justification exists for this holding, especially where the
issue of manufacturer culpability may be proven by alternative methods
which are less confusing, clearly probative, and beneficial to a long-
standing policy of encouraging remedial measures.
Robert Rend Rabalais

